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INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC 
INTERESTED REGULATION 
ELIZABETH GARRETT* 
 Steven Croley’s scholarly project develops an alternative vision of 
administrative process, the model of public interested regulation,1 
and applies that new framework to a series of real world examples to 
test its explanatory power.2 Croley’s work is consistent with much of 
the most promising legal and political science literature, particularly 
with a body of scholarship often referred to as institutional theories 
of the political process or the “new institutionalism.”3 The institu-
tions through which individuals must act, whether singly or as mem-
bers of groups, profoundly affect their behavior and the outcomes 
they achieve. Different institutions have different characteristics and 
operate under different rules and procedures.4 Moreover, each policy 
is considered and affected by several different institutions, some-
times simultaneously and sometimes consecutively. Understanding 
this, players in the political arena will behave strategically, working 
within and among institutions to align the ultimate policy as closely 
as possible with their preferences. 
 Institutions do not appear magically. They are created and shaped 
by individuals, usually acting in groups. To the extent possible, po-
litical actors will try to adopt rules and procedures that allow them 
to achieve their preferences in most cases and that place obstacles in 
the way of those who are likely opponents. Procedures are not immu-
table; they can be changed by the current political players.5 Change 
in institutional design can be difficult, of course, and the difficulty 
varies according to the durability of the procedures.6 Constitutional 
rules are relatively durable, requiring supermajority votes at the 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor and Deputy Dean, University of Chicago Law School. I appreciate the 
helpful comments of my colleague Eric Posner and the excellent research assistance of Ve-
ronica Spicer. 
 1. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM . L. REV. 1, 152-56 (1998). 
 2. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 54-84 
(2000). 
 3. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ,  JR. ,  PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 97 (2000). 
 4. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1994). 
 5. See JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? CONGRESS, THE BUDGET 
PROCESS, AND THE DEFICIT 230 (1990) (“Congress determines its own rules, and it is fully 
capable of eliminating procedures and arrangements that do not serve its members’ pur-
poses.”). 
 6. See Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution with Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 471, 502-03 (1999) [hereinafter Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution] (de-
scribing variance in the durability of different procedures shaping the legislative environ-
ment). 
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state and national level to amend; legislative rules can be changed 
only after meeting several constitutional requirements, such as bi-
cameralism and presentment. Rules set forth by the judiciary can be 
changed through judicial opinion, although norms like stare decisis 
can limit flexibility. The Administrative Procedure Act, 7 the proce-
dural law that Croley studies, is a combination of legislation (argua-
bly, of the quasi-constitutional type but changeable by subsequent 
legislative action), judicial decision, and agency practice.8 
 Furthermore, although institutions can change, they cannot 
change in infinite ways. There is an element of path dependency that 
affects the possible permutations; new actors are limited by what has 
occurred in the past and what is accepted by society and other play-
ers. Sarah Binder makes this point in her study of the differences be-
tween procedures governing the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.9 Although policy preferences of the relevant actors affect pro-
cedural decisions, “[a]t any given time in a chamber’s history, a set of 
inherited rules marks the contours of a legislative body.”10 Changing 
inherited rules is possible, but there must be both the will to act and 
a political environment that makes action possible. Both conditions 
are not always satisfied. For example, stringent budget rules adopted 
during periods of large federal deficits make it more difficult for 
lawmakers to enact new spending programs. 11 Although many legis-
lators might prefer a world with different budget rules or no proce-
dural constraints, Congress found it difficult to amass majority sup-
port to repeal these rules, even in an era of budget surpluses.12 Law-
makers feared that voting to repeal budget caps or other disciplining 
institutions could be portrayed in the next election as symbolic of 
support for big government or imprudent fiscal policies. 13 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                  
 7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
 8. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE 
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 126 (1997) (“[J]udicial review and central executive branch con-
trols often proceduralize in ways that both are unanticipated by legislators at the time of 
enactment and have general effects across a huge number of policy domains.”). 
 9. See SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 13 (1997). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements 
in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, 
Harnessing Politics]. 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel J. Parks, Even GOP’s Toughest Budget Hawks Perceive Fiscal 
Caps’ Time Has Passed, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, Jan. 29, 2000, at 176 (discussing the difficulty 
Congress has had in repealing budget caps set in different economic conditions). At the end 
of the 106th Congress, legislatures did raise the spending caps significantly, but they tried 
to limit any political fallout by slipping the change into a large appropriations bill. See 
Daniel J. Parks, Ballooning the Bottom Line: Blame Enough for Two Parties, CONG. Q. 
WEEKLY, Oct. 28, 2000, at 2530. 
 13. See sources cited supra note 12. 
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political climate made a vote to eliminate inherited rules somewhat 
costly for elected officials. 14 
 Lawmakers and other political players who find particular insti-
tutional arrangements inhospitable to their policy goals and who be-
lieve that straightforward change is politically impossible have other 
alternatives. They can seek to manipulate rules and procedures so 
that they do not operate as roadblocks. Again, the budget process 
provides a compelling example of interest groups and lawmakers re-
sorting to gimmicks and timing tricks so that they appear to comply 
with budget rules while still passing laws providing federal benefits 
to important constituencies. 15 Circumvention may entail costs and 
may not allow legislative actors to meet their preferences perfectly, 
but, under certain political conditions, such strategies may be more 
successful than modification of the institutions themselves. 
 In some cases, political actors succeed in co-opting institutions 
and procedures so that they actually facilitate outcomes that the 
drafters may not have envisioned.16 Croley notes that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and related statutes establish a rulemaking 
procedure that is relatively open to public scrutiny.17 All things being 
equal, he asserts, interest groups seeking self-interested outcomes 
prefer to operate in the shadows. 18 I am not sure this argument is 
necessarily convincing. If only one interest group is involved in legis-
lation or if all interest groups can coordinate by logrolling, secrecy 
might benefit them. But if a policy affects many interest groups with 
adverse or inconsistent interests, groups might prefer relatively open 
procedures so that they can monitor legislative action, learn of regu-
latory proposals that might harm them, and work to defeat them. 
Croley’s case study of the regulation of financial services provides an 
example of an environment of active and antagonistic interest 
groups.19 The banking, insurance, and securities industries found the 
                                                                                                                  
 14. See Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution, supra note 6, at 482. 
 15. See Garrett, Harnessing Politics, supra note 11, at 526-30. 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the 
Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM . L. REV. 702 (2000). The budget process has provided an 
example of this phenomenon:  
In other cases, procedures are adopted in response to public outcry concerning 
a high-profile issue or for other reasons, but particular members or groups in 
Congress learn that a byproduct of the new framework is an increase in their 
clout relative to other congressional players. Thus, they will work to retain and 
extend the procedures, thereby augmenting their own power and serving their 
self-interest. 
Id. at 705; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality: Or, Public Choice and 
the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 123-25 (2000) (discussing the dif-
ference between causation and opportunism). 
 17. See Croley, supra note 2, at 39-42. 
 18. See id. at 41-42, 46-47. 
 19. See id. at 75-84. 
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openness of the administrative process conducive to their efforts both 
to change regulations and to block proposals that would harm them. 20 
 Even if Croley’s conclusion is accurate and organized groups gen-
erally prefer closed policy-making institutions, they may be able to 
manipulate the more open system to their advantage. In a compara-
ble institutional arena, that of congressional committees, rules re-
quiring public decisionmaking and deliberation increased the influ-
ence of organized interests over policy outcomes. “Sunshine-in-
government” reforms are ostensibly designed to empower ordinary 
citizens who can participate more easily in public hearings and can 
monitor the behavior of their representatives when votes are re-
corded and public.21 At the same time, however, interest groups can 
also obtain better information to ensure that lawmakers are acting 
consistently with their promises to support legislation that benefits 
the groups.22 Because interest groups are organized and often have 
financial resources, they can monitor lawmakers more easily than 
citizens, inform other interested persons of relevant votes or behav-
ior, and discipline representatives who do not follow their directives. 
When committees did much of their work behind closed doors, mem-
bers could more often diverge from the preferences of powerful inter-
est groups without fear of punishment. Ironically, maximizing oppor-
tunities for participation has also maximized the opportunity for 
strategic behavior.23 
 This example is not the only one that suggests interest groups can 
manipulate procedures that might not have been designed to em-
power them. To use a different example that is familiar from admin-
istrative law, scholars have argued that the aggressive judicial re-
view of notice-and-comment rulemaking has allowed organized inter-
ests to delay and block regulatory initiatives, arguably leading to os-
sification of the regulatory state.24 It seems unlikely that the judges 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See id. at 85-87. 
 21. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act § 3(a), 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994 & Supp. V 
1999) (requiring that every meeting of an agency be open to public observation). 
 22. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1343 (1994) (“The APA, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the extensive provisions for judicial 
review all ensure that factions have many points of access and influence. Factions monitor 
intensively; agency space given to public officials has become a point for objection.”); see 
also Dale Bumpers, How the Sunshine Harmed Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at W9 
(“Before government was conducted out in the sunshine, senators could vote as they 
pleased, good or bad, with little voter retribution on individual issues.”). 
 23. See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 1344 (stating that “[f]actions have ensured . . . 
that regulations therefore reflect interest groups’ strength rather than benefits to the pub-
lic”).  
 24. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
95-103 (1990) (explaining how interest groups thwarted efforts to establish auto safety 
testing guidelines); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Pro-
posals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 
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who adopted a robust notion of arbitrary-and-capricious review in-
tended to strengthen the position of groups that could remain organ-
ized long enough to contest agency decisions and that had the re-
sources to fund litigation. Nonetheless, the process has been used in 
that way time and time again. 
 Like institutional scholars, Croley focuses on process and the way 
that institutional design determines the range of possible policy out-
comes. He argues that much of administrative process may work to 
the disadvantage of organized interests, 25 contrary to the conclusions 
of some writing in the public choice tradition.26 Furthermore, he con-
tends that modern administrative procedures insulate agencies from 
strict congressional control, which may also reduce the clout of or-
ganized interest groups if they have disproportionate influence over 
elected lawmakers. 27 He does not disagree that organized interests 
are key players in the policy-making game; rather, he argues that 
they are not the entire story. In that sense, I view his work as consis-
tent with the best scholarship analyzing the legislative and adminis-
trative processes. Rather than dismissing this scholarship as “public 
choice lite,” as Cynthia Farina does in her comment,28 we can more 
accurately characterize it as sophisticated analysis of an extraordi-
narily complex process affected by dozens of players with varied mo-
tivations working within and among many different institutions to 
achieve a variety of objectives. Some public choice literature is reduc-
tionistic, in part to focus our attention to one particular feature of the 
political landscape, but a more complete understanding requires us 
to use insights from institutionalists, civic republicans, public and 
social choice theorists, and scholars in other disciplines and fields. 
The resulting scholarship may be messier than economic analysis re-
lying on extremely simple models, but it more closely captures the 
reality of the process. 
                                                                                                                  
485-90 (1997) (outlining arguments on both sides of the proposition that judicial review 
creates ossification); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of 
American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 760, 766 (1996) (discussing the ori-
gins of ossification and effects of modern judicial and administrative developments); 
Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Prob-
lem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 626 (1994) (giving examples of fear of judicial invalidation as 
reason that regulatory agencies do not adopt hard and fast rules). 
 25. As I will discuss later, until Croley articulates his view of the public interest, it is 
hard to determine the baseline against which to measure any disadvantage suffered by or-
ganized interests. Moreover, as the banking case study reveals, interest groups often pu r-
sue conflicting agendas. Thus, an outcome that harms one interest group may benefit a dif-
ferent one. 
 26. See Croley, supra note 2, at 12-14 (describing public choice literature). 
 27. See id. at 33-45. 
 28. Farina, supra note 16, at 115; see also Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the 
Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 9 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1774 
(1998) (using, in a review of Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 8, the term “public choice lite” (in 
a neutral rather than derogatory sense) for the approach Mashaw favors). 
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 Moreover, Croley’s articles should be seen as part of a larger pro-
ject to construct procedures to channel interest group activity in 
ways that produce positive outcomes and reduce rent-seeking. Be-
cause interest groups are ubiquitous in the policy arena and because 
organization and financial resources often lead to political clout, it is 
naïve to design institutions that rely on public-spirited and altruistic 
individuals in order to work well. 29 Institutions can be designed, how-
ever, to shape interest group activity in particular ways and 
ameliorate its negative consequences. For example, the public com-
ment proceedings during informal rulemaking require interested 
parties to present vast amounts of technical data to agency adminis-
trators, along with reasoned arguments on policy outcomes.30 A busi-
ness or organized group may adopt a particular position for selfish 
reasons—to eliminate or reduce competition, for example—but it 
cannot successfully present arguments of that type during public de-
liberation. Instead, it will have to make arguments acceptable under 
the norms of public discourse. Indeed, because of judicially imposed 
requirements that shape agency deliberation and decisionmaking 
and executive orders requiring particular analyses to accompany 
traditional rulemaking, interested parties must present certain kinds 
of reasoned arguments with compelling evidence to support them. 
Thus, the procedures and institutions that shape administrative de-
liberation produce positive externalities from interest group activity, 
namely, the production by private entities of information useful to 
government officials.31 
 Although Public Interested Regulation makes a significant contri-
bution to our understanding of the complicated administrative proc-
ess, it is not a complete story. First, Croley understates the influence 
of organized interest groups in his three case studies. 32 One of the 
examples, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC’s) de-
cisions interpreting federal statutes liberally to allow banks to enter 
various nonbanking activities,33 is best understood as an accommoda-
tion of the competing objectives pursued by influential and organized 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60-62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 30. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE 
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 195-99 (1994). 
 31. Cf. Garrett, Harnessing Politics, supra note 11, at 556-61 (making a similar point 
about certain budget rules and information about tax expenditures). 
 32. Professor Croley uses three case studies of recent regulatory initiatives to explore 
Congress’s relationship with the agencies. He considers “the motivations for agency behav-
ior, the role of the administrative process in constraining or liberating agencies, and extra-
legislative influences on agency behavior.” Croley, supra note 2, at 9. The case studies in-
clude a discussion of the OCC and the demands of national banks to enter complementary 
financial service industries, a discussion of the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision 
to create stricter regulations of ozone and particulate matter, and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s decision to regulate tobacco products.  
 33. See id. at Part IV.C.  
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interest groups. Although the outcome may be in the best interests of 
consumers and the economy, it also represents the triumph of banks 
over their competitors. In the other two cases,34 organized interests 
may be unhappy with the policies pushed aggressively and success-
fully by policy entrepreneurs leading the regulatory agencies, but the 
losing interests have continued to fight the regulations in court. So 
far, the judicial challenges have succeeded, although in one case it is 
not yet clear whether the interests of the diffuse and relatively unor-
ganized public will finally prevail over those of narrower business in-
terests. 35 
 Second, Croley notes that he has saved for another day the ques-
tion of how to determine whether particular regulatory policies serv-
ing broad-based rather than narrow interests are socially beneficial 
or socially wasteful.36 He is right to point to this question as the next 
puzzle for his project. Thus far he has declined to answer perhaps the 
most fundamental questions: What is the public interest? Against 
what baseline should we judge regulatory outcomes to determine 
whether they are normatively desirable or not? Although the lesson 
Croley draws from his case studies is that administrative procedures 
insulate regulators from congressional pressure and allow them to 
implement public interested regulations, the most we can currently 
conclude from his work is that procedures appear to empower regula-
tors to implement regulations consistent with their preferences. 
Whether those preferences mostly, or even usually, align with the 
public interest remains an open question. 
I 
 The three case studies presented by Croley concern highly salient 
issues that caught the attention of all three branches of government, 
a variety of policy entrepreneurs37 and, at times, substantial portions 
of the public. In that sense, they are atypical of most regulatory deci-
sions and may well exhibit unusual characteristics.38 As Croley con-
tinues with his project to determine the prevalence of public inter-
                                                                                                                  
 34. See id. at Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 35. [Editor’s Note: On February 27, 2001, the Supreme Court reversed in part Ameri-
can Trucking Associations v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001).] 
 36. See Croley, supra note 2, at 107.  
 37. A policy entrepreneur is someone “in or out of government who, through adroit 
use of the media, can mobilize public support by appealing to widely shared values such as 
a concern about health, safety, or environmental preservation and by making opponents 
seem self-serving and careless of the public interest.” KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. 
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84 (1986). Douglas Arnold re-
fers to these political players as “instigators.” R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 30 (1990). 
 38. Croley acknowledges that “these three [case studies] are not offered as a random 
selection of regulatory cases.” Croley, supra note 2, at 54. 
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ested regulation, he should also describe and assess more common-
place regulatory proceedings. I am unsure what conclusions such 
studies will support. It may be the case that interest groups are more 
active when regulatory decisions provoke less publicity, although the 
notice-and-comment procedure of informal rulemaking works to con-
struct an environment of relatively robust pluralism where the pres-
ence of competing and diverse interest groups may minimize the abil-
ity of any one to capture the process. Similarly, it is unclear whether 
congressional control over regulators will be more or less effective in 
lower profile contexts. The plethora of recent legislative proposals 
designed to provide Congress with more information about pending 
regulations and to allow more frequent and less costly congressional 
interference39 suggests that lawmakers do not believe that they cur-
rently have the ability to conduct aggressive oversight. 
 However, Croley’s focus in Public Interested Regulation is directed 
toward three of the most controversial and well-known recent regula-
tory initiatives. He concludes that the regulatory outcomes in all 
three serve the public interest, rather than private-regarding inter-
ests of powerful factions, and that congressional control over these 
initiatives has been tenuous at best.40 As we revisit his examples, I 
will explore three additional conclusions. First, an outcome arguably 
serving the public interest may also be consistent with the objectives 
of a narrow special interest that has managed to prevail in a costly 
and vigorous competition. Some public interested regulation is a for-
tuitous result of the right interest group winning the competition, al-
though the ability of the group to use convincing substantive argu-
ments may well have contributed to its success. 41 Second, an agency’s 
final rule does not necessarily represent the final policy equilibrium. 
Interest groups may decide to pursue their objectives in different in-
stitutions—typically, the courts or the legislatures—once it is clear 
that they will not prevail in front of an agency. Such a strategy, al-
though costly and not always successful,42 may be the best option 
when the regulation has provoked significant public attention and 
when the effort is spearheaded by a zealous policy entrepreneur at 
the helm of the agency. Finally, Croley’s case studies most persua-
                                                                                                                  
 39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit 
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 269-71 (1996) (discussing such proposals in the 104th Con-
gress); see also Croley, supra note 2, at 48-49 (discussing such initiatives in Republican 
congresses). 
 40. See Croley, supra note 2, at 106. 
 41. Croley makes this point early in his article with respect to the case study of bank-
ing regulation. See Croley, supra note 2, at 17-18. 
 42. See generally Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, The Government Litigation Advan-
tage: Implications for the Law , 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391 (2000) (arguing empirically that 
the government litigant has certain advantages in appeals before the Supreme Court, 
which reduce the likelihood that an interest group will prevail in that judicial institution). 
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sively reveal that the framework put in place both by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and the court decisions interpreting it insu-
lates regulators from oversight by Congress and frees them to pursue 
their own agendas with relatively little interference during the 
agency rulemaking. This last observation will lead us finally to a dis-
cussion of the meaning of the key term in Croley’s work: the public 
interest served by public interested regulation. 
 As Croley details, the OCC, along with Congress and the courts, 
has faced the demands of national banks to enter complementary fi-
nancial services industries. 43 Of course, national banks were not the 
only financial service providers hoping to enter new markets with the 
permission of regulators. Other businesses in this sector worked to 
offer their customers traditional banking products such as checking 
accounts and consumer loans. The field of banking regulation has 
long been characterized by strained statutory interpretations and 
awkward organizational arrangements, such as intricate networks of 
related businesses in a bank holding company structure or strange-
sounding creatures like nonbank banks.44 Such unusual business 
configurations were necessary as banks, securities firms, and other 
financial services businesses evolved and competed in an environ-
ment shaped by an anachronistic set of laws passed in vastly differ-
ent economic and political times. 
 Until recently, the laws regulating commercial banks were passed 
many decades ago when lawmakers were mainly concerned about 
bank soundness and the specter of widespread bank runs. 45 Legisla-
tors (as well as the public and most experts) believed that one way to 
ensure safety and soundness for depositors was to restrict the activi-
ties allowed to banks.46 Furthermore, legislators, again along with 
the vast majority of the public, believed that banks should remain 
small and local and that large national banks not only posed a threat 
to economic stability but were also somehow un-American.47 As the 
country moved further from the Great Depression, however, our no-
                                                                                                                  
 43. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussing the OCC’s decision to allow na-
tional banks to sell fixed and variable rate annuities and to allow banks to sell crop insur-
ance). 
 44. See HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS , JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 241-66 (1999). 
 45. See KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW 
COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 145 (1984) (citing deposit insurance as a means of 
protecting small depositors and small investors). 
 46. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970) 
(discussing the legislative history of provisions limiting activities open to banks). 
 47. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 45, at 145; Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing 
Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 507 (2000); Elizabeth Garrett, Note, 
The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice to Inject Market Discipline into 
the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1987) (stating that the two o b-
jectives of creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) were to protect 
small depositors and achieve monetary stability). 
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tions of acceptable banking activities changed. Now, most sophisti-
cated observers believe that banks will be stronger and sounder if 
they have a diversified portfolio of activities. 48 Regulatory policy need 
not aim to prevent any bank failure, or even any failure of medium-
sized or large banks, in order to protect the economy.49 Furthermore, 
activities not traditionally engaged in by commercial banks are seen 
as less risky and less frightening as more Americans invest in the 
stock market and own a variety of financial products, many of which 
are not protected by explicit government guarantees like deposit in-
surance. 
 Although our notion of what regulatory policy best serves the pub-
lic interest has changed over time—assuming that the conclusions of 
most economists, sophisticated financial commentators, and the pub-
lic determine the public interest—the laws restricting the activities 
of commercial banks remained on the books. 50 Congress retained 
these outdated laws primarily because businesses that would have to 
compete with commercial banks favored restrictive legislation pro-
tecting their market share.51 Insurance companies and securities 
firms did not want Congress to allow banks to offer products similar 
to theirs because they preferred a less competitive market artificially 
constrained by federal law and regulations.52 Of course, they seldom 
made their anticompetitive arguments explicitly; rather, they argued 
that the public interest was better served by rules that kept banks 
out of risky businesses like insurance. More liberal rules, they con-
tended, put the economy at risk and exposed the government to the 
prospect of paying billions of dollars in deposit insurance or other as-
sistance when banks failed and the regulators stepped in to rescue 
customers. The savings and loan crisis in the 1980s gave these ar-
guments some credibility by providing an example of the govern-
ment’s financial exposure when institutions failed because they had 
invested in unacceptably risky ventures or entered markets in which 
                                                                                                                  
 48. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and 
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United 
States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 110 (1995) (citing studies which show that banks engaged in 
securities activities are less likely to fail than those which are not engaged in such activi-
ties). 
 49. See Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: 
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE . J. ON REG. 215, 215 
(1988) (arguing that federal banking regulations which encourage depositors to monitor 
banks’ risk levels—and consequently exert their market influence by patronizing only 
banks that achieve acceptable levels of risk—are sufficient to ensure the safety of banks 
and protect the economy). 
 50. See, e.g., Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999).  
 51. See Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest-Group Competition and 
the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services’ Political Ac-
tion Committees, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1163, 1170 (1998) (studying the effort to repeal the 
Glass-Steagall Act as a battleground between commercial banks and investment banks). 
 52. See id. 
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they lacked expertise.53 Commercial banks also couched their argu-
ments in public interest rhetoric. Representatives of the interest 
groups may well have sincerely believed their arguments, or they 
may have deployed the arguments strategically.54 Nonetheless, they 
spurred and participated in a larger public debate about what regu-
latory policy best serves the aggregate interests of the public in our 
modern and more global economy. 
 Even if members of Congress became convinced that the commer-
cial banks had the better argument, they may well have delayed 
passing more liberal laws because the interest group conflict pro-
duced substantial campaign contributions and other benefits to 
members of committees with jurisdiction over such legislation. Com-
mercial banks provided financial resources to lawmakers in the hope 
legislation would be passed; insurance companies, the securities in-
dustry, and other competitors did the same to preserve the status 
quo. The latter dynamic is a powerful example of rent extraction. 
Fred McChesney argues that: 
payments to politicians [campaign contributions, gifts, post-tenure 
employment] often are made, not for particular political favors, but 
to avoid particular political disfavor, that is, as part of a system of 
political extortion or “rent extraction.” . . . Because the state, quite 
legally, can (and does) take money and other forms of wealth from 
its citizens, politicians can extort from private parties payments 
not to expropriate private wealth. . . . In that sense, rent extrac-
tion—receiving payments not to take or destroy private wealth—is 
“money for nothing” in the words of the song.55 
 In order for rent extraction to work, legislators’ threats to harm 
interest groups must be credible. The banking context provided an 
environment conducive to credible threats by lawmakers because 
powerful interest groups with clout were actively pressuring Con-
gress to pass legislation expanding the range of their permitted ac-
tivities. 56 Congress did not act, in part, because it could not (lawmak-
ers representing powerful interests could block legislation) and, in 
part, because it did not want to act (all lawmakers benefited from the 
competitive interest group environment). In some sense, the regula-
                                                                                                                  
 53. Of course, many have argued that the presence of government insurance and 
other federal regulatory structures actually encouraged savings and loan institutions to in-
crease their exposure to risk in clearly imprudent ways. See, e.g., Macey & Garrett, supra 
note 49, at 215, 218-19. 
 54. See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103, 113 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 
1986) (suggesting that, in public discourse, th e requirement that at least lip service be paid 
to arguments about the public good may lead to sincere consideration of such reasons for 
action). 
 55. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICAL EXTORTION 2-3 (1997). 
 56. See Kroszner & Stratmann, supra note 51, at 1170. 
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tions and judicial decisions altering the landscape only helped law-
makers interested in prolonging the interest group activity because 
they provided a release when old regulations became too restrictive. 
Moreover, regulatory and judicial actions kept the area unsettled, 
providing for many possible legislative fixes over time and encourag-
ing numerous interests to become actively involved in the political 
process. 
 In the end, as Croley reports, Congress did act, largely because 
the competition between the interest groups ceased as a compromise 
was forged in the wake of OCC rules and judicial decisions. 57 Con-
gressional acquiescence in a transformed financial services sector, 
characterized by large national banks and financial service providers 
with diversified portfolios of products and services, has occurred not 
only in the insurance context, but also finally in the context of in-
vestment banking with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.58 I agree 
with Croley that the new regulatory structure better serves the pub-
lic interest, as I understand it, but it also serves the interest of cer-
tain strong, organized private interests. The example demonstrates 
powerfully that the public interest is not necessarily always inconsis-
tent with the interests of private actors. It is not enough to say that a 
particular interest group has prevailed in order to know whether the 
resulting policy is good or bad for the rest of us. 59 Furthermore, it is 
not the case that the old regulatory structure was the result of in-
vidious interest group activity; rather it served an older, now dis-
carded vision of the public interest as well as the private interests of 
those who opposed more robust competition. 
 While the OCC example is a case study of powerful and competing 
interest groups’ fighting for years in numerous institutional arenas,60 
the other two examples that Croley offers may present a different 
                                                                                                                  
 57. See Croley, supra note 2, at 83-84. 
 58. Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 
1338, 1341 (1999). 
 59. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 34-35 (1991) (arguing that interest group activity does not nec-
essarily lead to outcomes inconsistent with the public interest). Croley also notes that “at 
least part of the time even groups organized to promote a specific trade or industry appear 
to favor regulatory policies that plausibly do advance broad interests.” Croley, supra note 
2, at 17. 
 60. To use a typology familiar to students of legislation, the dynamics surrounding 
policy decisions affecting the regulation of financial institutions provide an example of ro-
bust interest group politics. The other two case studies appear, in contrast, to provide ex-
amples of majoritarian politics. See ESKRIDGE , JR. ET AL., supra note 3, at 91-94 (drawing 
on the work of Michael T. Hayes, Theodore J. Lowi, James Q. Wilson, and Mancur Olson to 
produce a typology of interest group activity in the legislative process); see also Theodore J. 
Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD 
POL. 677, 688 (1964) (arguing that the political relationship among demanders of the legis-
lative product is “determined by the type  of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy 
there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship”). 
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configuration of interests. Croley argues that in the tobacco and 
ozone/particulate rulemakings, there were on one side organized pri-
vate interests and on the other broad-based, diffuse, and largely un-
organized public interests. 61 In fact, the diffuse interests at stake in 
both regulations are represented by organized and relatively influen-
tial groups, including the health industry and medical establishment, 
environmental groups, and other public interest groups. 62 Public 
choice and other interest group theorists have for some time ac-
knowledged that such large groups can form and exert political clout, 
and they have discussed why environmental groups seem particu-
larly adept in the political realm. 63 Thus, again as in the OCC case 
study, we may have a situation of competing interest groups in a 
robustly pluralistic environment. One side won in each rulemaking, 
and that side supported policy that Croley views as compatible with 
the public interest. Indeed, we may not be very surprised that large 
membership groups with influence in every district would be particu-
larly successful in the legislative or executive branches. Organization 
is only one ingredient for political success; larger, dispersed groups 
that can overcome collective action barriers to coordinate their mem-
bers’ efforts often have more influence than small groups, even if the 
latter are more cohesive and disciplined. 
 But even if we accept Croley’s characterization of these two case 
studies as pitting organized economic interests against diffuse and 
relatively unorganized public interests, we should add two further 
conclusions to his case studies. First, it is not clear that Croley’s 
“good guys” have won the policymaking wars, even if they did win 
the battles of the rulemakings.64 In both cases, federal courts of ap-
peals struck down Croley’s public interested regulations. 65 And, in 
the tobacco case, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court, find-
                                                                                                                  
 61. See Croley, supra note 2, at 84-85. 
 62. See id. (listing public interest groups and other organized interests that supported 
the regulatory agenda of the FDA and EPA); see also id. at 91-92 (noting that environ-
mental groups have political clout but claiming that they have relatively less influence 
than private economic interests). 
 63. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 57 (3d ed. 1997) 
(pointing out that environmental groups specialize in certain areas to attract members); 
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 105, 117 (1982) (noting the Sierra Club’s effective-
ness at raising funds); Christopher J. Bosso, Adaptation and Change in the Environmental 
Movement, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 151, 154-65 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis 
eds., 3d ed. 1991) (examining how environmental issues have remained at the forefront 
since the early 1970s). 
 64. [Editor’s Note: American Trucking Associations v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), which held that the 
EPA rules reflected an interpretation of the Clean Air Act violative of the nondelegation 
doctrine, was reversed as to the delegation issue by the Supreme Court on February 27, 
2001. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001).] 
 65. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d 1027; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir. 1998) (striking EPA air quality regulations and FDA 
tobacco regulations respectively), aff’d , 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
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ing that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate tobacco.66 
The economic interests harmed by the regulations did not give up the 
fight; instead, when it became clear that they would not prevail in 
the informal rulemakings, they shifted their efforts to a new institu-
tion. Not surprisingly, the tobacco companies attacked the FDA’s 
regulation in a sympathetic forum—the extremely conservative 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals located in the heart of the country’s 
tobacco-growing region.67 The opponents of the ozone/particulate 
regulations faced a less sympathetic group of judges, but the eco-
nomic interests knew they stood a good chance of convincing an often 
libertarian court that the EPA’s regulation was invalid. Indeed, they 
won (for the time being) more than they had hoped for, receiving in 
Judge Williams’ opinion an aggressive articulation of the nondelega-
tion doctrine that can be used to strike down other regulatory initia-
tives. 68 
 Of course, going to court is not a certain route to victory, and the 
strategy means that the economic interests may face more battles be-
fore the Supreme Court and then perhaps again before the agencies 
on remand. But immediately after the rulemaking, it is premature to 
conclude that private interests have been vanquished by public-
regarding regulators—the policy process has not concluded. One of 
the lessons of institutional analysis and positive political theory is 
that the process seldom ends definitively; losers can always seek to 
modify or reverse the decision of one institution by appealing to an-
other. Even if the tobacco industry had lost on the issues of statutory 
interpretation that convinced a majority of the Supreme Court, it 
could have challenged the substance of the regulation as arbitrary 
and capricious or it could have gone to Congress for legislative 
change. At the least, it would have been able to delay implementa-
tion of the regulation until it reached a compromise solution with the 
political branches. Although every regulatory loser can adopt this 
strategy of seeking new review in different institutions, organized 
groups like the tobacco industry or trade organizations are often in a 
better position to pursue such options because they have the organi-
zation to remain politically active for some time and they have the 
financial resources to hire the best lawyers and advisers. 
 I am not arguing that the private interests would not have vastly 
preferred to avoid the rulemaking outcomes that Croley character-
izes as public regarding. Certainly, an early victory would have been 
                                                                                                                  
 66. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1314 (2000). 
 67. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d at 158 (originally filing 
suit in the federal district court for the Middle District of North Carolina). 
 68. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1030-40. [Editor’s Note: American 
Trucking was reversed as to the delegation issue by the Supreme Court on February 27, 
2001. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001).] 
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much cheaper and would have had fewer negative public relations 
ramifications. But given the salience of the issues involved—smoking 
at a time of strong public disapproval of the habit and the protection 
of air quality in an era of heightened environmental awareness—the 
passion of the particular regulators for these rules, and at least the 
acquiescence of Congress to the agencies’ proposals, 69 the economic 
interests had little choice but to move the battlefronts to other insti-
tutions. Nor am I arguing that the final equilibria will necessarily 
favor the economic interests; the political process is complicated and 
subject to more than the influence of organized interests. In these 
cases, which are exceptional for several reasons, the tobacco industry 
and the businesses burdened by the EPA’s ozone/particulate regula-
tions may find their influence limited. My primary point is that or-
ganized interest groups have systematic advantages in a world 
where policy takes a long time to formulate and involves several dif-
ferentiated institutions. 
 The third conclusion I would draw from Croley’s case studies is 
consistent with his thesis that administrative procedure insulates 
agencies from close control by Congress,70 although I am not sure 
that the procedure necessarily empowers the representatives of the 
public interest. In these three cases, and most particularly in the to-
bacco and ozone/particulate rulemakings, procedure has allowed 
zealous policy entrepreneurs with strong visions of appropriate regu-
latory outcomes to adopt regulations consistent with their visions. 
Croley’s stories about Carol Browner and David Kessler reveal 
strong-willed and talented policy advocates who used their positions 
to place certain issues on the policy agenda (or in Kessler’s case, to 
take advantage of developments in state courts and other policy fo-
rums to move a salient issue higher on the federal policy agenda) and 
then used the resources of their agencies to adopt solutions that they 
favored.71 When Congress delegates substantial power to executive 
branch officials through broad and vague statutory language and has 
limited the ability to take the power back or otherwise discipline 
wayward agency heads, we will sometimes see committed and ag-
gressive policy entrepreneurs using executive branch positions to 
pursue their own objectives. As long as they follow the APA’s proce-
dures and produce reasoned explanations sufficient to withstand ju-
                                                                                                                  
 69. I echo Farina’s series of questions to Croley about the position of Congress as an 
institution on these regulatory outcomes. See Farina, supra note 16, at 131-34. At least in 
the case of tobacco, the legislature was clearly ready to attack the tobacco companies and 
allow increased interference into their business affairs. 
 70. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that administrative procedures allow 
agencies to be autonomous and independent from congressional influence). 
 71. See Croley, supra note 2, at 87. Croley’s story of the OCC regulatory decisionmak-
ing also reveals the presence of a strong policy entrepreneur—Eugene Ludwig. See Croley, 
supra note 2, at 79-80. 
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dicial review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, they can 
shift policy away from the preferences of the enacting Congress to-
ward their personal preferences. 
 Note that my characterization is not substantially different from 
Croley’s conclusions in his case studies. In circumstances where 
agency leaders have strong personal commitments, they may be able 
to reach regulatory outcomes that organized economic interests op-
pose, and they can often resist a great deal of congressional pressure 
to reverse course. We do not know what other factors must be pre-
sent to allow entrepreneurs to succeed; there are surely many exam-
ples of agencies led by aggressive and zealous policy entrepreneurs 
who were not able to implement their priorities. The major difference 
between my description and Croley’s is one of emphasis: Croley be-
lieves that administrative procedure frees agencies to reach public 
interested outcomes; I am comfortable concluding only that in some 
cases agencies can be manipulated by zealous leaders to implement 
policies consistent with their preferences. The final question to which 
this characterization of administrative procedure leads us is the cru-
cial inquiry for Croley in subsequent work in his project: Is the 
agenda of a policy entrepreneur who heads a regulatory agency and 
who is relatively immune from congressional influence necessarily—
or even usually—consistent with the public interest? 
II 
 At several places in Public Interested Regulation, Croley reaches a 
conclusion that is compatible with but more expansive than my con-
clusion that administrative process sometimes allows regulators to 
implement policies they strongly support. He writes: “G iven the na-
ture of the administrative process, particularly in contrast to the leg-
islative process, administrators motivated by commitments to public 
interests can do what similarly motivated legislators may find diffi-
cult to do themselves.”72 Of course, procedure does not insulate only 
public spirited regulators; it insulates all administrators. Thus, to 
conclude that administrative procedure systematically leads to public 
interested outcomes, Croley must show that executive branch offi-
cials systematically pursue such outcomes. And, as a necessary part 
of that inquiry, Croley must grapple with the question he identifies 
but does not analyze in depth:73 What is a public interested outcome? 
 This article provides some hints about what Croley means by pub-
lic interested results. In several places he contrasts the preferences 
of narrow special interests with the preferences of diffuse, broad-
                                                                                                                  
 72. Id. at 27 (emphasis added); see also id. at 92 (noting that Browner, Kessler, and 
Ludwig “pursued their own visions of what public interests required”). 
 73. See id. at 106-07. 
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based groups, suggesting that the latter are public interested.74 But as 
he acknowledges in his conclusion, some of the preferences of diffuse, 
broad-based groups may be socially undesirable.75 As the American 
Association of Retired Persons and the National Rifle Association 
vividly demonstrate in the modern political arena, large, diffuse, but 
somewhat organized groups can rent-seek as avidly—and often more 
successfully—than small economic interests. Furthermore, it is not 
clear to me that policy entrepreneurs appointed to head agencies will 
systematically represent the interests of the diffuse and unorganized. 
These entrepreneurs often come from the ranks of the regulated in-
dustries and plan to return to that environment, or lobby on their 
behalf, when they end their public service. I am not claiming that 
regulators with such backgrounds will act strategically and cynically 
to enhance their post-tenure employment opportunities—although 
some doubtlessly will—but only that they may be more sympathetic 
because of their experience, perspective, and training to the interests 
of economic groups rather than those of the diffuse public. 
 Agency heads are also political appointees, and many will try to 
act as faithful agents of the President, both because he is their boss 
and because they share his ideological commitments. Thus, Croley 
might support his conclusion that agency entrepreneurs will work to 
devise public interested regulations by arguing that the President, 
with his national constituency, party leadership position, and limited 
term of office, is better suited to vindicate broad-based interests than 
are federal legislators. 76 This argument is a familiar one in institu-
tional literature, although it can be overstated.77 Some states, and 
therefore the interests that are influential within them, are more 
important to the electoral success of the President, his successor, and 
his party than others. He and those who lead his agencies may pay 
more attention to the preferences of these important constituencies 
rather than to any notion of the diffuse public interest. 78 Further-
more, although the President can serve only two terms, he is vitally 
concerned with the electoral fate of his successor who will be respon-
sible for ensuring the longevity of some of his policies. President 
                                                                                                                  
 74. See, e.g., id. at 84; see also id. at 106-07 (acknowledging that these questions are 
outside the principal focus of his article). 
 75. See id. at 106-08. 
 76. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 3; Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bu-
reaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
443, 446 (M. Nelson ed., 2000). 
 77. See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, 
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 827, 836 (1996).  
 78. See Benjamin Ginsberg, Walter R. Mebane, Jr., & Martin Shefter, The President 
and “Interests”: Why the White House Cannot Govern, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 361, 365-70. 
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Clinton could not run for a third term, but many of his decisions and 
actions demonstrated his keen interest in Al Gore’s candidacy, as 
well as his awareness of which states were most important to the 
outcome in November 2000. Nonetheless, considering institutional 
differences between the legislative and executive branches might 
lead to an explanation of why agencies would produce outcomes fa-
voring diffuse, unorganized groups (which in some cases may be pub-
lic interested outcomes) more often than the legislative branch. 
 Some policy entrepreneurs appointed to agency positions are drawn 
from the ranks of the academy. Perhaps these representatives of the 
intellectual elite are more in tune with the public interest than popu-
larly elected representatives. Perhaps not, however, if the public inter-
est corresponds somehow to preferences of a majority of the electorate. 
The elite, particularly those isolated in the academy, may not be the 
best reflection of majoritarian sentiments. Indeed, federal legislators 
who face frequent elections may well be more adept at aligning policy 
with the wishes of a majority of the electorate than any other political 
actors. Perhaps policy entrepreneurs from academic or similar back-
grounds are well equipped, however, to construct a deliberative proc-
ess that will ascertain and shape the objectives of diffuse and large 
masses of people. We need to know more about the abilities of these 
leaders before we can comfortably conclude that agency heads can de-
sign a system consistent with such civic republican goals. And, if this 
vision of policymaking is what Croley means by public interested regu-
lation, such a view of public interest must be justified. 
 In short, the next installments of Croley’s project analyzing public 
interested regulation promise to make significant contributions to the 
study of administrative law and procedures. First, he and other schol-
ars will present additional case studies, allowing us to test the conclu-
sions he offers here in different contexts. Croley mentions several pos-
sibilities for further detailed description, including agency decisions 
not to regulate.79 Second, and most important, he will further develop 
his theory of public interested regulation to determine whether admin-
istrators, given the backgrounds they bring to their jobs, the institu-
tions in which they work, and the interaction among regulators, the 
President, interest groups, and legislators, really do “aspire to vindi-
cate public interests.”80 Vital to the success of his project studying pub-
lic interested regulation, Croley must present a theory and description 
of the public interest—only then can we discover if the current admin-
istrative process operates to produce public interested regulation or 
not, and if particular procedural reforms are more or less compatible 
with the public interest. 
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